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Abstract
In response to the increasing rise of terrorist activities throughout the European Union (“EU”)
and the attacks of September 11, the Council of the European Union (“Council”) acted through its
powers under the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition to other measures, the Coun-
cil enacted regulations that froze the assets of alleged terrorist individuals and entities. In some
cases, the regulations froze assets of alleged terrorists that had been placed on a list published by
the U.N. Sanctions Committee, while in another, the assets of individuals were frozen after the
European Council itself placed individuals on a list that it had published. Faced with challenges
to these regulations, the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) has decided a series of cases that address
their legality. These decisions are far-reaching, and in some respects provocative and novel. Cen-
tral to the debate on targeted sanctions and human rights is the right to an effective remedy. In
addition to the cases filed with the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), cases have also been filed
in national courts in Europe, North America, Turkey, and Pakistan challenging the legality of tar-
geted sanctions. This Article discusses the human rights aspects of the cases decided by the CFI
and critiques the divergent results reached. It should be noted that appeals have been taken to the
ECJ.
TARGETED SANCTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Elizabeth F Defeis*
INTRODUCTION
In response to the increasing rise of terrorist activities
throughout the European Union ("EU") and the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, the Council of the European Union ("Council") ac-
ted through its powers under the Common Foreign and Security
Policy. In addition to other measures, the Council enacted regu-
lations that froze the assets of alleged terrorist individuals and
entities.' In some cases, the regulations froze assets of alleged
terrorists that had been placed on a list published by the U.N.
Sanctions Committee, while in another, the assets of individuals
were frozen after the European Council itself placed individuals
on a list that it had published.2
Faced with challenges to these regulations, the Court of
First Instance ("CFI") has decided a series of cases that address
their legality. These decisions are far-reaching, and in some re-
spects provocative and novel. Central to the debate on targeted
sanctions and human rights is the right to an effective remedy.
In addition to the cases filed with the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"), cases have also been filed in national courts in Europe,
North America, Turkey, and Pakistan challenging the legality of
targeted sanctions.' This Article discusses the human rights as-
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author would like to
thank her research assistants Stacie Bennett and KourtneyJ.A. Knop, Class of 2008, for
their assistance.
1. See Council Regulation No. 467/2001, art. 2(1), O.J. L 67 (2001).
2. See Council Regulation No. 2580/2001, O.J. L 344 (2001).
3. See THOMAS BIERSTEKER & SUE E. ECKHERT, STRENGTHENING TARGETED SANCTIONS
THROUGH FAIR AND CLEAR PROCEDURES 6 (Mar. 2006), available at http://watsoninsti-
tute.org/pub/Strengthening-TargetedI Sanctions.pdf. The so-called "terrorist" lists
and all cases filed with the CFI and the ECJ involving such lists are regularly monitored
at http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/terrorlists.html. To date, twenty-one cases
have been filed with the CFI and seven with the ECJ. These cases share arguments
invoking the violation of fundamental rights including the right to procedural reme-
dies. The majority have been dismissed because the Community is subject to UN Regu-
lations. Three of the cases before the ECJ are pending, the Advocate General has ren-
dered an opinion in two of the cases, one has been dismissed, and one found in favor of
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pects of the cases decided by the CFI and critiques the divergent
results reached. It should be noted that appeals have been taken
to the ECJ.
4
In September 2005, in Yusuf v. Council of the European Union
and Kadi v. Council of the European Union, the CFI affirmed the
supremacy of Security Council Resolutions over obligations
under the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and indeed, over treaty obli-
gations of Member States.5 The cases involved Ahmed Ali Yusuf,
a Swede of Arab origin, and Yassin Abdullah Kadi, a resident of
Saudi Arabia, who had both been placed on a list of alleged ter-
rorists by the U.N. Sanctions Committee. Prior to the attacks of
9/11, the Security Council adopted resolutions that required
States to freeze all funds and other financial resources con-
trolled directly or indirectly by individuals associated with the
Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and the Al-Qaeda network.6 Pursu-
ant to these resolutions, the U.N. Sanctions Committee pub-
lished a list of alleged terrorists, which included petitioners
Yusuf and Kadi.7 These regulations were put into effect within
the European Community ("Community") by Council regula-
the applicant and was returned to the CFI. See http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/
terrorlists.html.
4. Whether the Council was competent to adopt such regulations is not discussed
in this article. For a discussion of the competence issue, see Laurent Pech, Trying to
Have it Both Ways-On the First Judgments of the Court of First Instance Concerning EC Acts
Adopted in the Fight against International Terrorism, 1 IR. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (2006).
5. SeeYusufv. Council, Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 231; Kadi v. Coun-
cil, Case T-315/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 181.
6. See S.C. Res. 1267, 1 4(b), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Paragraph
4(b) mandates that States must, "freeze funds and other financial resources, including
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated
by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, and ensure that neither they nor
any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, by their nation-
als or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any
undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may
be authorised by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian
need." Id. To ensure this is implemented, Paragraph 6 establishes a Security Council
Committee to oversee implementation of the Regulation. See id. According to Bier-
steker & Eckhert, 925 individuals and entities were listed as of early 2006 by the U.N.
Sanctions Committee's active listing, and 46 had been delisted. See BIERSTEKER &
ECKHERT, supra note 3, at 6.
7. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 24; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 1 23.
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tions ordering the freezing of the funds of the individuals in-
volved.8 The petitioners claimed that the sanctions were in viola-
tion of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for disciplinary ac-
tions against states, but not individuals.9 Petitioners also claimed
that their fundamental rights, including their right to make use
of their property, their right to a fair hearing, and their right to
an effective judicial remedy, were violated.'"
The CFI, in an expansive holding, rejected all of the conten-
tions of the applicants. It noted that Article 11 (1) of the Treaty
on the European Union provides that the Community should
implement a common foreign and security policy to safeguard
common values, fundamental interests, and the independence
and integrity of the Union, to strengthen the security of the
Union in all ways, and to preserve peace and strengthen interna-
tional security in conformity with the U.N. Charter.1" The CFI
held that the Treaty Establishing the European Community
("EC Treaty") empowers the Council to impose economic and
financial sanctions on individuals as well as third countries, when
a common position adopted by the European Union under the
common foreign and security policy so provides.' 2 Although Ar-
ticle 301 of the EC Treaty empowers the Council to impose eco-
nomic sanctions on "one or more third countries,"' 3 the Court
noted that in the past the Council had taken restrictive measures
against persons who constructively governed a part of a country,
and against persons or entities associated with them or who pro-
vided financial support to them.' 4 This type of "smart" sanction
8. See Council Regulation No. 467/2001, art. 2, O.J. L 67 (2001).
9. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 301, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. C 325/33, at 161 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. "Where it
is provided, in a common position or in ajoint action adopted according to the provi-
sions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and security
policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely,
economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the neces-
sary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission." Id.
10. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 190; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 59. The
Court noted that through Article 301, together with Articles 60 EC, 301 EC, and 308
EC, the Council was competent to enact the regulation. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533,
256; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 135.
11. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 11 (1), OJ. C.
325/5, at 15 (2002).
12. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 112; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 133.
13. See EC Treaty, supra note 9, art. 301, OJ. C 325/33, at 161 (2002).
14. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 114. In 1998, the Council enacted Regula-
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is aimed at individuals, is designed to reduce suffering of civil-
ians, and has been utilized by the Security Council since the
1990's.'" The Court then ruled that the Council was also compe-
tent, under similar conditions, to impose economic and finan-
cial sanctions-such as the freezing of funds of individuals-in
connection with the fight against international terrorism.'"
The CFI then turned to the relationship between the U.N.
and the European Union. It noted that, although the European
Union itself is not a member of the U.N., the Community is
bound by the obligations flowing from the U.N. Charter, in the
same way as U.N. Member States. 7 First, the Community may
not infringe the obligations imposed on its Member States by the
U.N. Charter or impede their performance of those obliga-
tions.'8 Second, the Community is required to adopt all the pro-
visions necessary to allow its Member States to fulfill those obli-
gations. t 9
The Court then discussed the interplay between rights guar-
anteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and possible con-
flict with Security Council resolutions and the regulations of the
EU. The Court noted that, under Section 103 of the U.N. Char-
ter, obligations of the Member States of the United Nations
under the Charter prevail over any other obligation, including
obligations under the European Convention and under the EC
Treaty.2" The Court stated:
From the standpoint of international law, the obligations
non (EC) No. 1705/98, allowing for restrictive measures against groups who physically
controlled part of the Angolan territory. Similarly, the Council enacted Regulation
(EC) No. 1294/1999 to both freeze funds and ban investments relating to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"). See Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 90.
15. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 94. "By so doing, the Community has been
able, continues the Council, to keep up with the development of international practice,
which has been to adopt 'smart sanctions' aimed at individuals who pose a threat to
international security rather than at innocent populations." Id.
16. See Yusuf [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 112; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 133.
17. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 24244; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 192-
93.
18. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 1 247; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 197.
19. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 248; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 1 198.
20. U.N. Charter art. 103. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail." Id.
2007] TARGETED SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
of the Member States of the United Nations under the Char-
ter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every other obli-
gation of domestic law or of international treaty law includ-
ing, for those of them that are members of the Council of
Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and, for those that
are also members of the Community, their obligations under
the EC Treaty.2 1
This paramountcy extends to decisions of the Security Council. 22
The Court observed that the Community regulations were
enacted to put into effect, at the Community level, decisions of
the Security Council that were enacted under Chapter VII of the
Charter.2 3 Under the U.N. Charter, it is the Security Council
that has primary responsibility for maintaining international
peace and security. 2" Any review of the internal lawfulness of the
regulation would therefore involve the Court in examining, indi-
rectly, the lawfulness of the decisions of the Security Council.
The Court stated:
It must therefore be considered that the resolutions of
the Security Council at issue fall, in principle, outside the am-
bit of the Court's judicial review and that the Court has no
authority to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness
in the light of Community law. On the contrary, the Court is
bound, so far as possible, to interpret and apply that law in a
manner compatible with the obligations of the Member
States under the Charter of the United Nations.2 5
Nevertheless, the CFI did reserve for itself one area of re-
view over Security Council decisions. The Court decided it
would examine the contested regulation and, indirectly, the Se-
curity Council resolutions, in light of the higher principles of
general international law, falling within the scope of jus cogens-
a peremptory norm of public international law from which
neither the Member States nor the bodies of the United Nations
21. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 231.
22. See id., 234. This aspect of the CFI's holding has been criticized. See, e.g., PIET
EECKHOUT, DOES EUROPE'S CONSTITUTION STOP AT THE WATER'S EDGE?: LAW AND POLICY
IN THE EU's EXTERNAL RELATIONS 23-50 (2005) (discussing his belief that Articles 307
EC and 224 EC do not require Member States to give effect to their obligations under
the UN Charter, and rather that "Articles 307 EC and 224 EC permit the Member States
to derogate from Community law obligations ....") (emphasis in original).
23. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 239.
24. See U.N. Charter art. 39.
25. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 276; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 225.
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may derogate. 26 In a novel interpretation of the jus cogens doc-
trine, the Court seemed to accept without question that rights
guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR") constitute jus cogens norms.27 The Court then consid-
ered claimed violations of human rights, including deprivation
of property, right of personal defense, and right of effective judi-
cial review, in light jus cogens norms, and found no violation of
jus cogens.28
II.
Subsequently in Ayadi v. Council of the European Union and
Hassan v. Council of the European Union, the CFI attempted to
clarify the rights of individuals whose funds had been frozen.2 9
Chafiq Ayadi, a Tunisian national resident in Dublin, and Faraj
Hassan, a Libyan national, were placed on the list maintained by
the U.N. Sanction Committee of persons associated with the
Taliban, Osama bin Laden, and the Al-Qaeda network; and their
assets were frozen.3 °
The Court, building on its decisions in Yusuf and Kadi, held
that the Community may freeze such funds in the context of its
battle with international terrorism.31 The Court acknowledged
that the measure was drastic, but would not prevent the individu-
als from leading satisfactory personal, family, and social lives.32
The Court focused on the procedures for delisting before the
Security Council, and found that they did not violate jus cogens
principles, as they related to a fundamental right to a fair hear-
ing.3 3 The Court reviewed the procedures of the U.N. Sanctions
26. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 1 (2007) (defining jus cogens).
27. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
28. See Yusuf, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 277-346; Kadi, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 225-
291.
29. See Ayadi v. Council, Case T-253/02, [2006] E.C.R. -, 118-57; Hassan v.
Council, Case T-49/04, [2006] E.C.R. -, 1 95-129.
30. See Ayadi, [2006] E.C.R. _, 28; Hassan, [2006] E.C.R. -, 30. The Council
effectuated Security Council Resolution 1390 through the adoption of Council Regula-
tion No. 881/2002. See O.J. L 139/9, at 9-10 (2002). This resolution was adopted after
repealing Council Reg. 467/2001 (supra note 1).
31. See Ayadi, [2006] E.C.R. -, 116; Hassan, [2006] E.C.R. -, 92.
32. See Ayadi, [2006] E.C.R. -, 126; Hassan, [2006] E.C.R. -, 102.
33. See Hassan, [2006] E.C.R. -, 92. The procedures before the United Nations
Sanctions Committee have been widely criticized as lacking due process safeguards and
depriving targeted individuals and entities of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
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Committee, which have since been amended, and noted that al-
though individuals could not petition the Security Council di-
rectly, they had the right to request review through the govern-
ment of the country in which they live or of which they are na-
tionals.34 The Court stressed that the right of an individual to
request such a review is guaranteed by the Community legal or-
der, and that, should the national authorities refuse to request
such a review, the aggrieved individual should have the ability to
request judicial review of such action before a national court.3 5
The Hassan case is interesting in that the plaintiff relied on
two judgments of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, each of which held that freezing the assets of
an organization under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 without a prior hearing infringed the consti-
tutional right of due process.6 This argument was deemed irrel-
evant by the CFI, because the U.S. cases cited did not involve
measures transposing Security Council Resolutions, but rather
See, e.g., BIERSTEKER & ECKHERT, supra note 3, at 16-18 (discussing various problems with
the U.N. Security Council's sanctioning practices, including failure to notify listed indi-
vidUals and entities, lack of information regarding the basis for listing, complicated
procedural requirements for delisting requests, and the overall lack of transparency of
committee procedures); see also Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges,
and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 153, U.N. Doc. A/
59/565, (Dec. 2, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf.
34. See Ayadi, [2006] E.C.R. -, 149.
35. See Hassan, [2006] E.C.R -, 92; see also, generally, IAIN CAMERON, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS AND UNITED NA-
TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL COUNTER-TERRORISM SANCTIONS (2006), available at http://
www.coe.int/t/e/legal-affairs/legal-co-operation/public international-law/
Texts_&_Documents/2006/I.%2OCameron%2OReport%2006.pdf (outlining the basic
requirements of due process in criminal and civil matters under the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights, which forms part of the Community legal order). In the con-
text of sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia, rather than targeted sanctions, the European
Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ireland ("Bosphorus Airways")
rejected petitioner's contention that rights under the ECHR had been violated by the
EC Regulation mandating the impoundment of the aircraft. The ECJ had previously
upheld the sanctions at issue in Bosphorus. See Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v. Ire-
land, Case C-84/95, [1996] E.C.R. 1-3953. The European Court of Human Rights
found that the provisions adopted by the Community offered protection "equivalent" to
those that the Convention provides. The Court stated: "By 'equivalent', "the Court
means 'comparable': any requirement that the organisation's protection be 'identical'
could run counter to the interest of international co-operation pursued." Id. 155. See
also BIERSTEKER & ECKHERT, supra note 3, at 16-18.
36. See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); see also National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
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involved measures adopted by the United States pursuant to its
own sovereign powers.
3 7
Ill.
In a subsequent case, the CFI focused on the procedures
followed by the Council itself in identifying terrorists and freez-
ing their assets in instances where Security Council Resolutions
left this decision to Member States, and came to a different re-
sult. In Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of
the European Union, an exiled Iranian group was placed on a list
of banned terrorist organizations by the European Union, al-
though they had not been specifically placed on the list pub-
lished by the Sanctions Committee. 8 Resolution 1373 of the
U.N., enacted after September 11, 2001, left to Member States
the competence to specifically identify persons, groups and enti-
ties whose funds would be frozen in accordance with the legal
order of the State."9 That Resolution was implemented in the
Community through a regulation of the Council, which ordered
the freezing of assets of persons and entities included in a list
established and regularly updated by Council decisions. 40 The
Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran was placed on
this list, and the EU froze their assets.4"
The Court criticized the Council's actions, and distin-
guished the case from Yusuf and Kadi. In contrast with the pre-
September 11, 2001 resolutions involved in those cases, the Se-
curity Council resolution did not identify the persons and enti-
ties in question, but instead left that determination to the Mem-
ber States.4 2 Thus, the Court found that the identification of
37. See Hassan, [2006] E.C.R. _, 120.
38. Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the European
Union, Case T-228/02, [2006] E.C.R. _.
39. See id., 99-102. Specifically, the Resolution called for all States to, "[flreeze
without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons who
commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commis-
sion of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such per-
sons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons
and entities, including funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by such persons and associated persons and entities." S.C. Res.
1373, 1(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sep. 28, 2001).
40. See Organisation des Modjahedines, [2006] E.C.R. -, 103 (referring to Council
Regulation No. 2580/2001, O.J. L 344 (2001)).
41. See Organisation des Modjahedines, [2006] E.C.R. -, 13.
42. See id., 101.
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such entities was an exercise of the Community's own powers,
and that the Council was required to observe fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Community legal order." In Yusuf and in
Kadi, on the other hand, the Community institutions were not
required to hear the parties concerned because the Community
institutions had merely transposed the Security Council resolu-
tions into the Community legal order.4 4
The petitioners in Organisation des Modjahedines were not in-
formed of any specific information or evidence pertaining to
them, nor were they given a statement of reasons for the action
taken by the Council.45 Under these circumstances, the Court
held that fundamental rights and safeguards, including the right
to a fair hearing, the obligation to state reasons, and the right to
effective judicial protection, were violated.46 Since this involved
the exercise of Community powers rather than simply transfer-
ring Security Council decisions, the Community legal order must
be observed and the decision of the Council was annulled.4 7
The CFI declared, "the Court finds that the contested decision
does not contain a sufficient statement of reasons and that it was
adopted in the course of a procedure during which the appli-
cant's right to a fair hearing was not observed. 48
IV.
Taken together, these cases indicate that, although the Eu-
ropean Union is a willing and active partner with the U.N. in
efforts to combat international terrorism, basic tenets of the
Community legal order must be adhered to, particularly if the
Community acts in exercise of its own powers. However, rights
are not absolute, and will be balanced against requirements of
national security and international obligations. If the actions of
the European Council are mandated by Security Council deci-
sions, the EU regulations will be examined, not for compliance
with obligations under the European Convention on Human
Rights or other treaty obligations, but rather for compliance with
jus cogens norms. Indeed, the Court noted that decisions of the
43. See id., 102.
44. See id., 100.
45. See id., 64-65.
46. See id., 173.
47. See id., 1 174.
48. See id., 173.
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Security Council must be enforced, even if they violate treaty ob-
ligations such as those occurring under the European Conven-
tion of Human Rights.
49
However, the jus cogens analysis is puzzling. A jus cogens
norm is defined in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties as a peremptory norm of general international
law that is accepted and recognized by the international commu-
nity, from which no derogation is permitted.5 0 Acceptance ofjus
cogens as a peremptory norm is a relatively recent development,
and the exact content of that norm is the subject of much con-
troversy.5 Indeed, there is no agreement as to which rules are,
in fact, jus cogens.5 2
While it is generally accepted that prohibitions on geno-
cide, slavery, and use of force constitute norms of jus cogens, not
all fundamental rights can be regarded as peremptory norms."
The CFI, however, seems to have deemed the obligation to pro-
tect human rights a jus cogens norm, without specifying what
49. See id., 1 49.
50. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. "A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremp-
tory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general interna-
tional law having the same character." Id. In 2006, the International Court of Justice
endorsed the concept of jus cogens. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(The Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 126 (Feb. 3).
51. See A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1475, 1488-1491 (2003) ("Uus cogens] originated in the belief that moral prin-
ciples impose legal limits on state authority - in effect, applying a natural law approach
- [but] was codified [in the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties in 1968 and
1969] in a form that grounded limitations on states' freedom solely on acceptance of
those limits by states, that is, in a form shaped to satisfy positivist conceptions of the
nature of law.").
52. See 1 PPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 7 (RobertJennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992); see also Weisburd, supra note 51, at 1492-1500 (discussing the varying
"lists" of peremptory norms submitted by delegates to the Vienna Convention, as well as
the differing treatments of the concept of jus cogens in the Federal Courts of the United
States ); Anthony D'Amato, The Significance and Determination of Customary International
Human Rights Law: Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for
Change of Paradigms, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 47, 53 (1994) (discussing the fact that
even within the customarily accepted jus cogens violations of genocide, slavery, torture,
and inhuman treatment or punishment, substantial disagreements exist as to what falls
within the purview of these practices).
53. See IhN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 488-490 (6th ed. 2003);
Weisburd, supra note 51, at 1515.
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rights are jus cogens norms. The CFI did not engage in analysis
of customary international law to determine whether the rights
in question were in fact accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community as peremptory norms, but rather, it seemed to
assume that, since the rights were enumerated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR, their inclusion in
these instruments meant they constituted jus cogens norms.
This interpretation of jus cogens goes far beyond that accepted by
international courts that have considered the question, and be-
yond the commonly accepted definition of jus cogens among
scholars.55
For example, in addressing the petitioners' contention that
the contested regulations deprived them of their right to prop-
erty, the CFI indicated that the alleged violation of their right to
not be arbitrarily deprived of property would be examined solely
in relation to a potential violation of jus cogens.56 However, it
offers no explanation concerning why such a right is a jus cogens
norm. Although a right to property is included in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, its omission from the enumera-
tion of rights in the ICCPR is far from inadvertent, and can be
54. See, e.g., Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council of the
European Union, Case T-228/02, [2006] E.C.R. _, 135. (The Court did not discuss
whether property rights were accepted as peremptory norms).
55. See generally Tawhida Ahmed and Israel dejesis Butler, The European Union and
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 771 (2006). In Al-
Adsani v. UK, and Prosecutor v. Furundzija, torture was held to violate jus cogens norms.
See AI-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. 761 (2001);
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Statement of the Trial Chamber at the
Judgement Hearing (Dec. 10, 1998). Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights found thatjus cogens covers the fight to life in Victims of the Tugboat '13 de
Marzo' v. Cuba; and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found the right to
equality before the law and non-discrimination in Advisory Opinion OC-18/03; and a pro-
bation of slavery in Aloeboetoe v. Suriname. See Victims of the Tugboat "13 De Marzo" vs.
Cuba, Inter-Am. C.H.R. Report No.47/96 (1996), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/96eng/Cuba1436.htm; Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
Ser. C No. 15 (1993) available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ser-
iec_15_ing[1].pdf.; Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003, Requested by
the United Mexican States, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Mi-
grants, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Ser. A No. 18 (2003), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
docs/opiniones/serieal 8_ing.pdf.
56. Organisation des Modjahedines, [2006] E.C.R. -, 132. The CFI concluded, "the
Council may only adopt such a decision after having ensured that maintaining the par-
ties concerned in the disputed list remains justified, which implies that it must afford
them the opportunity effectively to make known their views on the matter." Id.
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attributed to an ideological conflict between East and West.57
The Court, however, assumes that the right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of property is a jus cogens norm, and then rejects the
applicants' arguments because the sanctions imposed were a
precautionary measure not affecting the substance of the appli-
cants rights. 58 Moreover, the Court notes that the measures
adopted by the U.N. in the context of the fight against interna-
tional terrorism and the procedures established by the Security
Council provide a mechanism for review before the Sanctions
Committee.59
With respect to a right to a fair hearing, the CFI acknowl-
edged that no "mandatory rule of public international law re-
quires a hearing for the persons concerned in circumstances
such as those of this case," but nevertheless described at length
the mechanisms available to individuals to challenge decisions of
the Sanctions Committee and request a delisting. 60 Finally, with
respect to an effective judicial remedy, the CFI rejected the ap-
plicants' arguments because, as a matter of law, the Court has
provided such a review in the context of the jus cogens analysis.
Further, although no international court is competent to chal-
lenge actions taken by the Sanctions Committee, such a "lacuna"
is not itself contrary to jus cogens.6
Thus, while first declaring that it lacks competence to review
Security Council decisions for conformity to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR"), the Court undertakes a review, based upon
jus cogens principles, without conducting a thorough analysis of
which norms are jus cogens and why. While undertaking this re-
view, the Court abandons the Community's human rights re-
gime, but insists on its power to review in light of international
peremptory norms. This approach was criticized in a report that
57. See Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 323 (1999).
58. Organisation des Modjahedines, [2006] E.C.R. -, 133-37.
59. See id., 100. Procedures before the Sanctions Committee have been harshly
criticized. See supra note 33.
60. Yusuf v. Council, Case T-306/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3533, 1 307. In the subse-
quent case, Ayadi v. Council of the European Union, the Court focused on the procedures
available in the Security Council for review of sanctions and also the obligations of
Member States with respect to a fair hearing required by the Community legal order.
See generally Ayadi v. Council, Case T-253/02, [2006] E.C.R. -, 118-57.
61. See A] Barakaat International Foundation, [2005] E.C.R. 11-03533, 1 341; Kadi
v. Council, Case T-315/01, [2005] E.C.R. 11-3649, 286.
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was prepared for the Council of Europe. 62 The report suggests
that, although under Article 103 of the U.N. Charter the Mem-
ber States are required to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council, nevertheless, Member States that are party to the ECHR
might incur State responsibility for violating the European Con-
vention if a State votes for sanctions in the Security Council or if
it implements them in its territory.6" Faced with increasing criti-
cism from Member States that procedures before the Sanctions
Committee violate due process, in December, 2006, the Security
Council amended its procedures and established a focal point to
receive delisting requests from individuals, groups, and under-
takings on the Sanctions Committee lists, as well as from govern-
ments. 64
The decisions of the CFI, if left intact by the ECJ, would
have far-reaching implications with respect to obligations under
Section 103 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that "in the
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail."" Indeed, taken as a
whole, the cases seem to indicate that, contrary to strong lan-
guage in the cases indicating that recommendations of the Se-
curity Council fall outside the ambit of general review, the ECJ
will be required to review Security Council resolutions in light of
fundamental rights. Moreover, if sanctions are imposed pursu-
ant to decisions taken by the European Council, basic tenets of
the Community legal order will be applied-including all obliga-
tions arising under the treaty obligations, which include proce-
dural due process rights, such as the right to a hearing and judi-
cial review. The ECJ, in adjudicating the appeals to the cases
discussed here, faces the daunting task of reconciling Commu-
nity principles with responsibilities under the international legal
order. The ICJ has, for example, declined to review the legality
of U.N. Security Council Resolutions." If in practice the ECJ
62. See CAMERON, supra note 35, at 7.
63. Id.
64. See generally S.C. Res. 1730 1-8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1730 (Dec. 19, 2006).
65. U.N. Charter art. 103.
66. Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United King-
dom), 2003 I.C.J. 149 (Sept. 10).
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chooses to review Security Council decisions under jus cogens
standards, and actually finds such decisions violate fundamental
rights, a new course in international cooperation will have been
charted, one with profound political implications.
